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ABSTRACT Cyber-physical systems (CPS) have the great potential to transform people’s lives. Smart
cities, smart homes, robot assisted living, and intelligent transportation systems are examples of popular
CPS systems and applications. It is an essential but challenging requirement to offer secure and trustworthy
real-time feedback to CPS users using spectrum sharing wireless networks. This requirement can be satisfied
using collaborative spectrum sensing technology of cognitive radio networks. Despite its promising benefits,
collaborative spectrum sensing introduces new security threats especially internal attacks (i.e., attacks
launched by internal nodes) that can degrade the efficiency of spectrum sensing. To tackle this challenge,
we propose a new transferring reputation mechanism and dynamic game model-based secure collaborative
spectrum sensing strategy (TRDG).More specifically, a location-aware transferring reputation mechanism is
proposed to resolve the reputation loss problem caused by user mobility. Furthermore, a dynamic game-based
recommendation incentive strategy is built to incentivize secondary users to provide honest information. The
simulation experiments show that the TRDG enhances the accuracy of spectrum sensing and defends against
the internal attacks effectively without relying on a central authority.
14
15
INDEX TERMS Cyber-physical systems, cognitive radio networks, dynamic game theory, reputation
mechanism, spectrum sensing.
I. INTRODUCTION16
Due to the rapid proliferation of mobile devices such as smart17
phones and various things equipped with built-in sensors18
and processors, Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS) have been19
attracting wide attention in both academia and industry [1].20
CPS is a system featuring a combination of computational21
and physical elements, all of which are capable of interacting,22
reflecting and influencing each other [2]. The emergence of23
the CPS will significantly change the way we see the world.24
In the meantime, the convergence of the physical and cyber25
spaces will exhibit a variety of complicated characteristics,26
which brings more open issues and challenges for research27
communities. Especially, how to provide secure and trustwor-28
thy real-time feedback relied on the existing wireless com-29
munication networks with limited spectrum resource is an30
essential and challenging requirement in CPS [2]. To tackle31
this challenge, as an efficient emerging technology, Cognitive32
radio network (CRN) based collabrative spectrum sensing33
(CSS) is introduced into the CPS to solve the spectrum 34
scarcity problem and provide reliable and secure real-time 35
communication [3], [4], where unlicensed users access idle 36
channels opportunistically based on the dynamic channels’ 37
sensing information, without creating any harmful interfer- 38
ence to primary users (PU) [4]. This method will also help to 39
incorporate billions of wireless devices for different applica- 40
tions such as Internet-of-Things (IoT), CPS, smart grids, etc. 41
These channels could be highly congested and may not be 42
able to provide secure and reliable communications in urban 43
areas [5]. 44
CSS can improve the efficiency of spectrum usage, but it 45
also introduces new security threats including internal attacks 46
during the spectrum sensing process, which can degrade the 47
effectiveness of spectrum sensing dramatically. For example, 48
an adversary may launch spectrum sensing data falsification 49
(SSDF) attacks, where the adversary corrupts a subset of 50
secondary users (SUs) as illustrated in the Fig. 1 to report 51
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FIGURE 1. SSDF attacks model.
falsified information, aiming to affect the final group deci-52
sion [6]. Moreover, an adversary may also launch internal53
Mobile attacks by moving position as shown in the Fig.2 to54
implement a new round interaction with the other secondary55
users as an initial secondary user.56
Many papers [7]–[12] propose various methods to improve57
the security in spectrum sensing. These solutions are usu-58
ally based on a centralized infrastructure, where a central59
authority plays an essential role in coordinating the attack60
defending. However, the centralized schemes will incur61
heavy communication overheads, and the malicious nodes62
can compromise the central authority to paralyze the entire63
system. Different distributed sensing schemes have also64
been proposed [13]–[17], using game theory [13], incentive65
design [14], consensus algorithm [15], [18], outlier detection66
and computation verification [17], etc. Most of the existing67
works ignore the internal SSDF attacks and Mobile attacks68
launched by an inside attacker that has the legal identity.69
In CPS, most client users are mobile and they access70
the CPS opportunistically. Therefore, there is an urgent71
need for a new secure and reliable CSS strategy to address72
above-mentioned limitations of existing methods by taking73
in account the characteristics of CPS. To design a new secure74
and reliable CSS strategy, it is necessary to analyze the75
trustworthiness of the users. Thus, reputation based CSS76
has been introduced into CPS to implement secure spectrum77
sensing [9], [12], [16], [18]–[24].78
Although some reputation based CSS strategies have been79
proposed in the literatures, most of them were based on the80
trusted third party and traditional cryptographic encryption81
and authentication techniques, thus ignoring internal attacks82
launched by an inside attacker that has the legal identity and83
dishonest recommendations used to frame up good parties84
and/or boost trust values of malicious peers. Moreover, they85
did not consider Mobile attacks and information leak.86
To overcome the above-mentioned problems, a transfer-87
ring reputation mechanism and dynamic game model based88
secure collaborative spectrum sensing strategy (TRDG) is89
proposed in this paper. In TRDG, a transferring reputation90
mechanism is firstly proposed. Then, a dynamic game based91
FIGURE 2. Mobile attacks model.
recommendation incentive strategy (DGRIS) is built. Finally, 92
a secure collaborative spectrum sensing strategy TRDG is 93
proposed based on the transferring reputation mechanism 94
and the DGRIS. The major contributions of this work 95
include: 96
(1) A location aware transferring reputation mechanism is 97
proposed to resolve the reputation loss problem during the 98
moving process of the SU. The proposed mechanismmakes it 99
possible to transfer the SUs’ reputation to the new interaction 100
area, which can better reflect the real-world nature of CPS, 101
and defend against the internal Mobile attacks. 102
(2) A dynamic game based recommendation incentive 103
strategy (DGRIS) is built to incentive the SUs to provide 104
honest information. The DGRIS makes the attacks’ utility 105
below cost, which decreases the motivations of the rational 106
malicious adversaries and thus can defend against the internal 107
SSDF attacks. 108
(3) A transferring reputation mechanism and dynamic 109
game model based secure collaborative spectrum sensing 110
strategy (TRDG) is designed to help secondary users (SUs) 111
sense the spectrum state and decide. SUs iteratively update 112
their local values to arrive at consensus, without help from 113
any central authority. 114
(4) Simulation experiments demonstrate that the TRDG 115
can provide an effective, secure and trustworthy spectrum 116
sensing countermeasure against the internal SSDF attacks 117
and Mobile attacks without relying on a central authority. 118
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. 119
Section II presents a brief review of the related work; 120
Section III describes the network and adversary models; 121
Section IV introduces the implementation details of the 122
TRDG strategy; Section V presents the performance evalu- 123
ation of the TRDG; Finally, Section VI concludes the paper 124
and discusses some future work. 125
II. RELATED WORK 126
In this section, we provide a literature review on the concepts 127
of collaborative spectrum sensing. Spectrum sensing in CRN 128
have been widely studied, using game theory [13], incentive 129
design [14], consensus algorithm [18], outlier detection and 130
computation verification [17], and etc. 131
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For instance, Mukherjee [13] discussed cooperative sens-132
ing problem in distributed CRN with the game-theoretic133
models. Mukherjee considered the utility function for sec-134
ondary users as improved sensing accuracy and examined135
the impact of various sensing parameters. Li et al. [14] first136
identified a new selfishness model named entropy selfishness137
in distributed CRN. They further proposed YouSense, a one-138
time pad based incentive design in which sensing reports139
were encrypted before sharing, to prevent the entropy self-140
ish users from learning the sensing reports, but the hon-141
est user can recover this plaintext by spectrum sensing.142
Zhang et al. [18] proposed a distributed and scalable cooper-143
ative spectrum-sensing scheme based on recent advances in144
consensus algorithms. In the proposed scheme, the secondary145
users can maintain coordination based on only local infor-146
mation exchange without a centralized common receiver and147
the proposed scheme used the consensus of secondary users148
to make the final decision. Zhang et al. [6], [16] designed a149
fully distributed security scheme ReDiSen to counter attacks150
in cooperative sensing. ReDiSen applied the reputation gen-151
erated from exchanged sensing results as an aid to restrict the152
impact of the malicious behaviours. Yan et al. [17] proposed153
a robust distributed outlier detection scheme with adaptive154
local threshold to counter covert adaptive attacks by exploit-155
ing the state convergence property. In addition, they also156
presented a hash-based computation verification scheme to157
effectively defend against colluding attackers.158
Amjad et al. [21] proposed a framework for trustworthy159
collaboration in spectrum sensing for ad hoc CRNs. The160
framework incorporates a semi-supervised spatio-spectral161
anomaly/outlier detection system and a reputation system,162
both designed to detect byzantine attacks in the form of163
SSDF from malicious nodes within the CRN. Sun et al. [25]164
proposed hard and soft fusion collaborative spectrum sensing165
schemes based on online hidden bivariate Markov chain166
modeling of the signals received by secondary users. The167
proposed schemes do not rely on precomputed thresholds or168
weights, and provide predictive information that can be used169
to improve the performance of dynamic spectrum access.170
Sharifi et.al proposed attack-aware CSS (ACSS) scheme to171
against SSDF attack in literatures [26] and [27], respectively.172
The ACSS proposed in [26] estimates attack strength and173
applies it in the k-out-N rule to obtain the optimum value174
of k that minimizes the Bayes risk. And, the ACSS pro-175
posed in [27] estimates the credit value of each cognitive176
radio user and identifies the malicious attackers along with177
their attack strategies by allocating an appropriate collabo-178
rative weight for each user, which improves the CSS per-179
formance effectively. Hsieh et.al [28] proposed a coalition-180
based model for the Interference-aware spectrum sensing181
to maximize the utility sum of all secondary users while182
observing the protection requirement of the primary user. The183
proposed model first formulates a joint threshold detection184
and coalition formation problem under the target cooperative185
model, and then explore important properties of the target186
problem.187
FIGURE 3. Architecture of CRN-CPS.
Overall, existing collaborative spectrum sensing methods 188
are usually based on a centralized infrastructure in which 189
a central entity coordinates the operations of the spectrum 190
sensing and sensing information collection, thus brings heavy 191
communication overheads and the issue that central authority 192
may be compromised by attackers. On the one hand, they 193
overlook the internal attacks launched by an inside attacker 194
that has the legal identity whose presence is likely in the 195
CRN and CPS environment. Consequently, it is still an open 196
problem and a challenging task to design secure and dis- 197
tributed spectrum sensing allocation schemes in CRN to resist 198
the internal attacks and provide sensing information security 199
protection. 200
III. SYSTEM AND ADVERSARY MODEL 201
A. SYSTEM MODEL 202
In this paper, we focus on the network environment of CRN 203
based CPS (CRN-CPS), which is a viable solution to imple- 204
ment fast and large-scale CPS applications [2], [4]. The 205
typical CRN-CPS architecture is depicted in Fig. 3, which 206
adopts the CRN as the access network. As shown in fig.3, 207
the CRN in the CRN-CPS is consist of a PU network and 208
a SU network. We suppose that each SU is equipped with a 209
cognitive radio and they utilize omnidirectional antennas to 210
communicate with each other. Meanwhile, SUs are located 211
within the transmission range of the PUs, and can individ- 212
ually sense the environment to detect the existence of the 213
Pus [16], [18]. In the CSS process, we use the energy sensing 214
method for a SU to detect PUs’ presence. We also assume 215
that an adversary can compromise a subset of honest SUs. 216
A SUmay provide incorrect information (including attacking 217
malicious SUs and honest SUs that sense incorrectly due 218
to severe fading or system failure) or correct information 219
(including honest SUs that sense correctly and non-attacking 220
malicious SUs). An honest SU has no a priori information 221
on which of its neighbors are malicious. If the final sensing 222
results indicate that the PUs are not transmitting on certain 223
channels, the SUs use the spectrum allocation scheme to 224
allocate and transmit on these channels. 225
B. ADVERSARY MODEL 226
In this paper, we focus on the internal attacks launched 227
by an inside legal and certificated user, which makes the 228
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FIGURE 4. The TRDG system structure.
traditional encryption and authentication techniques no229
longer effective. In the internal attacks, the attackers may230
or may not participate in the cooperative sensing process,231
and may report falsified values when participating. Further-232
more, we assume, in spectrum sensing, the following internal233
attacks will be launched by the inside malicious SU:234
• SSDF attacks: attackers corrupt a subset of SUs and235
strategically report falsified sensing results, aiming at236
incurring interference between the PUs and legitimate237
SUs and affect the final group decision.238
• Mobile attacks: attackers move to other position and239
disguised as an initial or normal SU to implement a new240
round interaction with the other SUs.241
IV. TRANSFERRING REPUTATION MECHANISM AND242
DYNAMIC GAME MODEL BASED SECURE243
COLLABORATIVE SPECTRUM SENSING STRATEGY (TRDG)244
In this section, a novel transferring reputation mechanism245
and dynamic game model based secure collaborative spec-246
trum sensing strategy (TRDG) is extended from our previous247
work [23], [24]. The TRDG integrates the collaborative spec-248
trum sensing with multi-level security, reputation mechanism249
and dynamic game theory to defend against the insider threat250
and enhance the securityand efficiency of spectrum sensing inAQ:1 251
distributed CRNbasedCPS. The system structure of TRDG is252
shown in figure 4, and the details of the TRDG are described253
as follows.254
A. DYNAMIC GAME BASED RECOMMENDATION255
INCENTIVE STRATEGY (DGRIS)256
Traditional reputation mechanisms improve the trustworthi-257
ness of recommendations through weighted summation of258
recommendations from different recommenders. However, in259
the open network environment such as CPS, these mecha-260
nismsmust face the significant problems caused by the selfish261
and malicious users who refuse to render the recommenda-262
tions in order to avoid consuming limited resources or provide263
dishonest recommendations so as to launch attacks. To over-264
come the above shortcomings, in this subsection, we first265
propose a dynamic game based recommendation incentive266
strategy (DGRIS). Then the DGRIS is incorporated into the267
recommend reputation evaluation tomotivate users to provide 268
honest recommendations. 269
In DGRIS, the principal agent theory [29], [30] is used 270
to incent recommenders to provide the honest information 271
during the recommend reputation evaluation process. In this 272
paper, we assume that the agent could take an action like 273
S = {honest response (h), fake response (f)} after principal 274
sends the request of cooperative spectrum sensing. Based on 275
the dynamic game theory that is proposed in this paper, for 276
example, if the neighbour secondary user replies with false 277
information, its reputation will be reduced as punishment. 278
When the value of reputation is lower than a threshold, no one 279
would be provided cooperative to this user. If the secondary 280
user SUa replies honestly, the payoff is Ua. The formula for 281
calculation is as follows: 282
Ua = 2 ∗ A ∗ Pd ∗ R (1) 283
A is the reward for secondary user of cooperative sensing 284
from requesting cooperative sensing secondary user. R is a 285
comprehensive value, according to the reputation valuewhich 286
passed by multipath and the requester’s reputation value from 287
local database. The more incentivize involvement of cooper- 288
ative sensing, the greater value would be. P is the detection 289
rate of spectrum sensing that is the probability of principal 290
exist with correct judgment, Pd = 1 − Pf , P will provide a 291
relative accurate sensing response. 292
The secondary user is rational. If the secondary user who 293
offer collaboration provides an honest response, its own giv- 294
ing a fake response to other secondary users. The payoff is 3A 295
and the other’s is –A; Both secondary users provide an honest 296
response, then the payoff is 2A for each; They will receive 0 if 297
two sides all offer fake response. 298
As for the i-way interaction process of cooperative spec- 299
trum sensing, it can be divided into the following situations. 300
(a) All secondary user provides honest response, so the 301
total payoff is as follows: 302
Ux = 2 ∗ A+ (
∞∑
i=2
Ua) ∗ R 303
= 2 ∗ A+ 2 ∗ A ∗ [R/(1− Pd ∗ R)] (2) 304
(b) The first round offers a fake response, then other rounds 305
give honest responses, the total payoff is as follows: 306
Uy = 3 ∗ A− A ∗ R+
∞∑
i=3
0 = 3 ∗ A− A ∗ R (3) 307
(c) The secondary user provides fake response continu- 308
ously. The first cooperation is likely to succeed, but from 309
the second-round other secondary users will not offer honest 310
response any more. The total payoff is as follow: 311
Uz = 3 ∗ A+
∞∑
i=2
0 = 3 ∗ A (4) 312
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(d) Providing an honest response first, then giving the fake313
response. The total payoff is:314
Upi = 2 ∗ A+ 3 ∗ A ∗ R+
∞∑
i=3
0 = 2 ∗ A+ 3 ∗ A ∗ R (5)315
In the situation of repeated games, the two situations com-316
pared:317
Situation (a) with situation (b), if Ux > Uy, then 2 ∗ A +318
2 ∗ A ∗ R1−Pd∗R > 3 ∗ A − A ∗ R and 0 ≤ R ≤ 1, so319
R ≥ 3+Pd−
√
(3+Pd )2−4Pd
2Pd
and R is monotonically increasing320
with the value of Pd changes. Since 0 ≤ Pd ≤ 1, then321
R ≥ 2−√3. Therefore, if R ≥ 2−√3, the total payoff of the322
strategy with honest response is greater than the payoff from323
deceive strategy (situation b). To summarize: if R ≥ 2−√3,324
honest response strategy is a dominant strategy. Otherwise,325
secondary user will provide fake response.326
The next two situations compared: situation (a) with situ-327
ation (c), if the payoff of honest response is greater than the328
fake response‘s payoff, then Ux −Uz ≥ 0, that (
∞∑
i=2
Ua)∗R−329
A = (2∗A∗R)/(1−Pd∗R)−A ≥ 0. SoR ≥ 12+Pd andPd ≥ 0,330
in other words, R ≥ 1/2. Considering it may be collaborated331
again, the dominant strategy is choosing to response honestly.332
If R ≥ 1/2. Otherwise, a fake response would be provided by333
the secondary user.334
Compared situation (a) with situation (d), if Ux > Upi ,335
since 2 ∗A+ 2 ∗A ∗ R1−Pd∗R > 2 ∗A+ 3 ∗A ∗R, so R > 13Pd336
and 0 ≤ Pd ≤ 1 that R > 13 . Therefore, honest response is337
a dominant strategy, if R > 13 . Otherwise, the secondary user338
will provide a fake response.339
To summarize what has been mentioned above, consider-340
ing the long-term benefit, all secondary users expect to get341
cooperative spectrum sensing. If R ≥ 1/2, both sides provide342
honest response is Nash Equilibrium.343
After the secondary user moved, if the secondary user344
SUb doesn’t receive the collaborative report by its neighbor345
secondary user SUa, SUb will broadcast the reputation value346
of SUa to all other neighbor secondary users, in order to347
generate the corresponding reputation history information348
for SUa in the network. The safety of cooperative spectrum349
sensing in the network would be improved if keeping the350
value of reputation R ≥ 1/2. Using (2) to pass the value351
of reputation, it can effectively accelerate convergence for352
reputation value of SUa, which will provide incentive partici-353
pant for moved secondary users in cooperation and reduce the354
selfish behavior which only receive other’s cooperation and355
not voluntarily contribute to desired cooperative sensing.356
B. TRANSFERRING REPUTATION MECHANISM357
In distributed CRN based CPS, the proposed transferring rep-358
utation mechanism is run at each SU who stores its historical359
opinion towards the others in the relevant local database.360
And it consists of three components: direct reputation evalu-361
ation, recommend reputation evaluation and final reputation362
evaluation.363
When a SU wants to request (or provide) a service from 364
(or to) another SU (including unknown SUs), it will send 365
a request message to all neighboring SUs. Each neighbor- 366
ing SU receiving the request will first verify whether the 367
requestor’s security level (sl) satisfies the security require- 368
ment. If it is, the neighboring SU will execute the direct 369
reputation evaluation to judge whether the requestor is a 370
malicious SU. Otherwise, the neighboring SU will ignore 371
the request. The security level computation and assignment 372
please refer to our previous work [31], [32]. 373
If the direct reputation evaluation cannot lead to a decision, 374
the neighboring SU will further execute the recommended 375
reputation query using Algorithm 2 to query requestor’s rep- 376
utation from its neighbors. Afterwards, the neighboring SU 377
will evaluate the integrated recommended reputation combin- 378
ing the received replies of recommended reputations to the 379
query. Finally, it will evaluate the final reputation and decide 380
whether the requestor is a malicious SU or not. 381
Suppose SUx and SUy represent the requester and service 382
provider respectively. The final reputation of SUx and SUy, 383
denoted as RFinal , includes two components: One is the direct 384
reputation RDirect and the other is the recommendation repu- 385
tation RRec. The final evaluation results will be stored in the 386
local database of final reputation. 387
1) EVALUATION OF DIRECT REPUTATION 388
The direct reputation of SUx toward SUy is evaluated as 389
follows. 390
(1) If SUx is an unknown user, SUy will start the DGRIS 391
in 4.1 to ask for SUx’s reputation from its neighbors. 392
(2) Otherwise, the direct reputation evaluation between 393
SUx and SUy depends on the historical interaction and 394
dynamic real-time sensing information of the network, and 395
can be computed as (6). 396
RDirectTn = (IAs/IAtotal) ∗ϕTn∗(1− ϕlocation) (6) 397
where IAs and IAtotal denote the successful interaction num- 398
ber of times and the total interaction number of times during 399
T time periods, respectively. ϕTn is the weight factor, which 400
determines how much the distribution of the interactions 401
affects the direct reputation evaluation at time Tn, which is 402
given by 403
ϕTn =
[
1− e ∧ (−NIATn/(m∗n))
] ∗ n∑
l=1
(
NIAl
m
∗ l
n
) (7) 404
where m is the number of cycles in a time period, and n is 405
the number of time period. NIATn is the number of the cycles 406
that the interaction happens between SUx and SUy. NIAl is 407
the number of interaction in the l-st time period. ϕlocation 408
denotes how the real-time position change between SUx and 409
SUy affects the direct reputation evaluation at time Tn. The 410
larger the distance, the more untrusted the SUx . 411
ϕlocation = e−Elocation∗βlocation ∗ (1− e−|L−L ′|∗βlocation) (8) 412
In (8), the real-time position and the most recent position 413
is denoted as L and L’, respectively. We define |L-L’| as the 414
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distance between them. We also define Elocation as the error415
of location sensing and βlocation is the parameter that controls416
the weight of the location factor’s influence on the reputation.417
The details of the unidirectional direct reputation evalua-418
tion are shown in Algorithm 1.419
Algorithm 1 Direct Reputation Evaluation
Input: Requester SU ′xs information
Output: Whether SUx is a malicious node or not
1. Begin
2. Requester SUx sends a Request message;
3. SU ′xs neighbor SU such as SUy receives the Request
message;
4. If
(
SU ′xsl > Securitylevelrequirement
)
then
5. SUy executes the Direct Reputation Evaluation and
returns the result as:
6. RDirect=Direct_reputation (SUx);
7. Else
8. SUy drops the Request message;
9. End if
10. If (RDirect > THupperdirect ) then
11. RFinal = RDirect ;
12. Else if (THdowndirect < R
Direct < THupperdirect ) then
13. SUy executes the Recommendation Reputation
Query;
14. SUy executes the Recommendation Reputation
Evaluation;
15. SUy executes the Final Reputation Evaluation and
gets the RFinal ;
16. Else
17. RFinal = −1;
18. End if
19. If (RFinal < THdownfinal ) then
20. SUx is considered as a malicious node and will be
isolated;
21. Else if (THdownfinal < R
Final < THupperfinal ) then
22. SUx will be punished by decreasing its reputation
value;
23. Else
24. SUx is considered as a trustworthy node;
25. SUy sends Accept message to SUx ;
26. End if
27. End
2) EVALUATION OF RECOMMENDATION REPUTATION420
If the direct reputation computation cannot lead to a decision,421
SUy will first execute the recommended reputation query422
using Algorithm 2 to query SUx’s reputation and security423
level from its neighbors. Afterwards, SUy will compute the424
integrated recommended reputation combining the received425
replies of recommended reputations to the query, which will426
be described in the following.427
Suppose SUy receives n (n>1) direct recommendation428
opinions and m (m>1) transferring path based recommenda-429
tion opinions, then the integrated recommendation reputation,430
Algorithm 2 Recommendation Opinion Query
Input: Requester SU ′xs mac address, ID
Output: SU ′xs reputation and security level
1. Begin
2. SUy broadcasts a query message;
3. Wait (3-5seconds);
4. SU ′ys neighbor SUk receives the query message;
5. If
(
SU ′ysl > Securitylevelrequirement
)
then
6. {
7. If (there has the direct reputation and security level
opinions about SUx) then
8. SUk evaluates the direct recommend reputation
RDir-RecTn ;
9. Else
10. {
11. SUk ask neighbor s to provide the reputation
and security level
12. opinions about SUx ;
13. SUk evaluates the transferring path based
recommendation
14. reputation RPath-RecTn ;
15. }
16. SUk evaluates the integrated recommendation
reputation RRecTn ;
17. SUk executes the DGRIS and returns the RRecTn and
security level
18. opinions to SUy;
19. }
20. Else
21. SUk drops the query message;
22. End
RRecTn , can be computed as follows. 431{
RRecTn = η1 ∗ RDir-RecTn + η2 ∗ RPath-RecTn
η1 + η2 = 1, η1, η2 ∈ [0, 1] (9) 432
where η1, η2 are the weight factors, which determine how 433
much the direct recommendation opinions RDir-RecTn and trans- 434
ferring path based recommendation opinions RPath-RecTn affect 435
the final recommendation reputation evaluation, respec- 436
tively. The RDir-RecTn is from the direct recommenders 437
who has the reputation opinion about the SUx on its 438
local reputation database, and the RPath-RecTn is provided 439
by the transferring recommenders who provide the repu- 440
tation opinion about the SUx with the opinion from their 441
neighbors. 442
Let DirR = {dir − reci |i = 1 . . . n } and PathR = 443{
path− recj |j = 1 . . .m
}
be the direct recommenders set 444
and the transferring recommenders set, respectively. The 445
RDir-RecTn can be given by 446
RDir-RecTn =
1
n
∗
n∑
j=1,j∈DirR
(
slj
slmax
∗ RDirectj:x
)
(10) 447
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where slmax is the maximal security level. RDirectj:x is the direct448
recommend opinion about SUx provided by SUj.449
For a transferring recommender SUk , SUk ∈ PathR, if450
there are many recommend opinion about SUx coming from451
different paths, the most reliable path denoted as Rk:path452
is chosen based on the rules below. Here, we assume L(i),453
(i = 1, . . . , n) is the set of the recommend paths and each454
path includes j SUs.455
Rk:path = Max (ζ1 ∗ RL(i) + ζ2 ∗ SLL(i)), i = 1..n456
s.t. ζ1 + ζ2 = 1457
Th1 < EL(i) < Th2 (11)458
where ζ1 and ζ2 are the weight factors corresponding to459
the opinion and security level of path L(i) respectively. Th1460
and Th2 are the thresholds of EL(i). RL(i) and SLL(i) are the461
opinion and security level of path L(i) respectively. EL(i) is the462
energy consumption of path L(i). RL(i), SLL(i) and EL(i) can be463
computed as:464 
RL(i) = Min(
m∑
j=1
Rij/m,min(R
i
j))
SLL(i) = Min(SL ij )
EL(i) = m ∗Max(
m∑
j=1
E ij/m,max(E
i
j ))
(12)465
where Rij and SL
i
j are the opinion and security level of SUi466
in the j-th path, respectively. E ij is the energy consumption of467
SUi in the j-th path. SL ij is the security level assigned to the468
SUi in the j-th path according to the SU’s reputation value.469
And then, the RPath-RecTn can be computed as470
RPath-RecTn =
1
m
∗
m∑
k=1,k∈PathR
471
×
[
Rk:path ∗ RDirectk:x ∗ (1− ϕy:k,location)
]
(13)472
where ϕy:k,location ∈ [0, 1] is the influence factor of473
the location between the SUy and the recommender SUk .474
Algorithm 3 gives the details of the integrated recommended475
reputation computation.476
3) EVALUATION OF FINAL REPUTATION477
After getting the direct and recommended reputation, the final478
reputation can be computed as:479 {
RFinaly:x = α1 ∗ RDirecTn + α2 ∗ RRecTn
α1 + α2 = 1, α1, α2 ∈ [0, 1] (14)480
where α1, α2 are the weight factors for the direct reputation481
and integrated recommended reputation, respectively.482
C. SECURE COLLABORATIVE SPECTRUM SENSING483
STRATEGY (TRDG)484
CSS implements spectrum sensing through the SUs in a485
wide area. In CSS, each SU obtains a local measurement486
Algorithm 3 Integrated Recommended Reputation Evalua-
tion
Input: N direct recommendation information andM trans-
ferring recommendation information
Output: Integrated recommended reputation value
1. Begin
2. SUy receives n+ m Reply messages with the direct
and transferring recommendation information about
SUx ;
3. SUy executes the recommenders selection process;
4. For (i = 1; i <= n+ m; i++)
5. {
6. If
(
SU ′i sl > Securitylevelrequirement
)
then
7. {
8. If (SUi is a direct recommender) then
9. Put SUi into the recommenders set DirR;
10. Else
11. Put SUi into the recommenders set PathR;
12. }
13. Else
14. SUy drops the Reply message;
15. End if
16. }
17. SUy computes the RDir-RecTn , Rk:path and R
Path-Rec
Tn with
DirR and PathR;
18. SUy executes the integrated recommendation
reputation evaluation and returns the result as RRecTn ;
19. End
in a time interval. After a sensing session, a series of value 487
update sessions are executed by the secondary users. All 488
SUs exchange their local spectrum sensing results with their 489
neighbors within its communication range, and update their 490
own values based on the received values. Since CSS can 491
enhance sensing accuracy, while reducing the need for sen- 492
sitive and expensive sensing technology, it is proposed to 493
enhance the sensing performance [16], [18]. However, it is 494
vulnerable to the internal attacks threats, which will make the 495
performance of CSS degrade significantly. 496
To solve the above-mentioned problems, based on trans- 497
ferring reputation mechanism, dynamic game based recom- 498
mendation incentive strategy (DGRIS) and combining with 499
the characteristics of CRN, a secure collaborative spectrum 500
sensing strategy TRDG is proposed to improve the accuracy 501
and reliability of the sensing results, and defend against the 502
internal SSDF and Mobile attacks. In TRDG, a secondary 503
user combines its sensing results with the results of collabora- 504
tive group members to evaluate the true state of the channel to 505
improve the accuracy of sensing. Moreover, TRDG can also 506
punish the untrustworthy user to reduce the influence of the 507
false information to the network. 508
During the sensing data fusion and decision process, the 509
final reputation is put into (15) to compute the sensing data 510
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fusion result.511
8sd = (
γ∑
i=1,i6=d
RFinald :i ×9i)/
γ∑
i=1,i6=d
RFinald :i (15)512
where8sd is the sensing data fusion result when SUd requests513
the channel s. γ is the total number of the sensing result fed514
back by the other SUs. 9i is the state of the channel s sensed515
by the SUi, which is defined as516
9i =
{
0, s is busy
1, s is idle
(16)517
Then, the decision Osd can be made by518
Osd =
{
1 s is idle, 8sd ≥ λ
0 s is busy, otherwise
(17)519
where λ is the threshold of the channel being idle.520
The details of the TRDG are described in Algorithm 4. It is521
worth noting that DBlocalX is SU’s local reputation table. The522
size of the table is 1Mb-10 Mb depending on the number of523
cycles in the simulation, so the memory overhead is not much524
considering the memory size of modern devices.525
V. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION526
In this section, we implement our strategy and conduct simu-527
lation experiments usingMATLAB and compare TRDGwith528
RCSS in [21], JSSRA in [22], and ICS in [33].529
For evaluating our proposed framework for defending530
against aforementioned SSDF attacks andMobile attacks, we531
have considered an CRN of size 1000 m x 1000 m and the PU532
and the SUs whether honest or malicious, are mobile with533
their speed varying between 0 and 4 m/s which represents a534
CRN user moving around on foot. The maximum transmis-535
sion range s for both the PU and the SUs is 200 m. We have536
carried out simulations for both dense (100 secondary users)537
network configurations and the number of detectable chan-538
nels of each secondary user is 6. The parameters η1, η2, α1,539
α2, ζ1, ζ2, Ethreshold , are 0.4, 0.6, 0.3, 0.7, 0.5, 0.5, 0.5, which540
are empirical values obtained frommultiple experiments. The541
number of time period is 6, the number of cycle in a time542
period is 10, and the time period is 1s. All the graphs represent543
results that are averaged over 100 simulation runs.544
Because the Attack Ratio (AR) and Malicious SU Detec-545
tion Accuracy (MDA) are the common metrics to evaluate546
the performance of the reputation mechanism and incentive547
strategy, while the Spectrum Decision Accuracy Ratio (SDA)548
and False Spectrum Decision Ratio (FSDR) are the important549
and frequently used metrics to evaluate the feasibility and550
availability of the spectrum sensing strategy, they are chosen551
as the metrics in the performance evaluation when internal552
SSDF attacks and Mobile attacks are present. These perfor-553
mance metrics are defined as follows.554
â Attack Ratio (AR): The rate of the number of malicious555
users who launch attacks to the total number of mali-556
cious users.557
Algorithm 4 Secure Collaborative Spectrum Sensing Strat-
egy (TRDG)
Input: Wireless channel set C, detectable channel set CX ,
Output: Most trustworthy secondary users set, TSU
untrustworthy secondary users set UTSU and the sensing
data fusion result
1. Begin
2. The SUs wanting to transfer data setups the spectrum
collaborative detection secondary users set N by
broadcasts the REQestablish message on the common
control channel (CCC);
3. Any SU who receives the message and wants to
collaboration feeds back a RESPestablish and joins
the N ;
4. SUs and all members in the N initialize the
parameters of reputationmechanism, DGRIS, TRDG,
the reputation threshold (Ethreshold ), and detection
period of (T );
5. SUs broadcasts the collaborative request to the
members in N ;
6. The member in N receiving the request executes
the DGRIS and makes a decision whether to
participate in the collaboration and provide the honest
sensing results;
7. SUs monitors the CCC during [tstart , tstart + T ];
8. After receives the feedback messages, SUs executes
the following steps:
9. SUs selects the collaborative SUswhose security level
satisfies the security requirement and setup a new
collaborative SUs set ′N ;
10. SUs executes transferring reputation mechanism to
evaluate the reputation of the members in ′N ;
11. SUs sets up the most trustworthy secondary users set
TSU;
12. SUs sets up the untrustworthy secondary users set
UTSU;
13. SUs executes the TRDG to compute the sensing data
fusion result;
14. SUs executes the channel search scheme(CSS):
CSS(TSU);
15. SUs update the reputation of the member in TSU and
UTSU and broadcasts it on the CCC;
16. SUs punishes(UTSU);
17. SUs transfers the reputation of those members in
N that do not feedback any sensing information
to the neighbors within one-hop communication
distance;
18. End
â Malicious SU Detection Accuracy (MDA): The per- 558
cent of malicious SUs that is correctly identified by the 559
reputation management system. 560
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FIGURE 5. Attack ratio of TRDG with DGRIS and TRDG without DGRIS.
â Spectrum Decision Accuracy Ratio (SDA): The per-561
cent of decision made by the proposed spectrum sensing562
strategy is the same as the actual state of the channel.563
â False Spectrum Decision Ratio (FSDR): Percent of564
state of the channel misidentified by the proposed spec-565
trum sensing strategy.566
1) ATTACK RATIO (AR)567
First, we compare the AR of TRDG with DGRIS with the568
TRDGwithout DGRIS and theAR performance of the TRDG569
with that of the ICS to investigate the influence of the incen-570
tive mechanism on the attacks defense. In the simulation,571
we set a hostile network environment with 50 percent of572
the malicious SUs, and the estimated value is converged to573
constant values after applying almost 100 rounds of sensing.574
In Fig. 5, the simulation results show that the AR of575
the TRDG without DGRIS is higher than the TRDG with576
DGRIS. For the TRDG with DGRIS, the incentive mech-577
anism DGRIS makes the attacks utility below cost, which578
effectively decreases the attack wishes of the malicious SUs579
and leads to the AR of TRDG with DGRIS decreases with580
the simulation rounds increases. But for the TRDG without581
DGRIS, there has no incentive mechanism to incentive SUs582
to provide true information and punish the SUs who provide583
the false information, so the malicious SUs will continue584
launching attacks and its AR maintains a stable state.585
The AR comparison results between TRDG and ICS586
considering the SSDF and Mobile attacks are shown587
in Fig. 6(a) and (b), respectively. In Fig. 6(a), we consider588
the SSDF attacks, as expected, the AR of both ICS and TRDG589
decreases with the simulation round increases, which demon-590
strate that both the ICS and TRDG can effectively defend591
against the SSDF attacks. Because both ICS and TRDG adopt592
reputation mechanism to judge whether a SU is a malicious593
user according to its reputation, and also adopt incentive594
mechanism to decreases the attack wishes of the rational595
malicious adversaries, so the rational malicious attackers will596
give up attacks to avoid being punished and costing more, and597
leading to the AR decrease.598
In Fig. 6(b), we consider the Mobile attacks, from the599
results we can find that different from the SSDF attacks, the600
AR of TRDG is lower than that of the ICS, which means that601
the Mobile attacks affects the ICS more than for the TRDG.602
In ICS, it connects sensing participation to the reputation603
FIGURE 6. Attack ratio (a) with SSDF attacks (b) with mobile attacks.
FIGURE 7. Malicious SU detection accuracy (a) with SSDF attacks (b) with
mobile attacks.
through a user-dependent pricing function to offer stronger 604
incentives for honest SUs to participate in the CSS. How- 605
ever, it ignores the Mobile attacks, and cannot transfer the 606
reputation of the mobile malicious SUs to the new interaction 607
area, which makes it cannot avoid the reputation loss problem 608
during the moving process of the SU. And then, the malicious 609
SUs in the new interaction area will be disguised as an initial 610
or normal SU and been design an initial reputation to execute 611
a new round interaction with the new neighbors. So, although 612
the AR of the ICS decreases with the simulation round 613
increases, it will finally maintain a relatively stable state and 614
it is much higher than the AR of the TRDG. In TRDG, a 615
transferring reputation mechanism is proposed to make the 616
reputation transmission possible, which makes the mobile
AQ:2
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malicious SUs cannot veil its previous malicious behaviors,618
and defend against the internal Mobile attacks effectively.619
Thus, the AR performance of the TRDG is better than the620
ICS.621
2) MALICIOUS SU DETECTION ACCURACY (MDA)622
Next, we will evaluate the effectiveness and reliability of the623
three strategies by comparing theirMDAperformance to each624
other in the presence of SSDF and Mobile attacks.625
The results in Fig. 7(a) and (b) show the MDA of the626
three strategies increase with the simulation rounds increase627
in the presence of the SSDF and Mobile attacks. This is628
because that all of the three strategies adopt the reputation629
model to evaluate the trustworthiness of a SU according to its630
reputation value. When a malicious SU launches attacks, its631
reputation value will be reduced, and if the reputation value of632
a SU is below a threshold, it will be identified as a malicious633
user. Since the more attacks the malicious SU launches, the634
lower its reputation value, which makes it more likely to be635
identified, so the MDA of the three strategies increase with636
more malicious users launch attacks.637
Moreover, it is also observed that the MDA of the TRDG638
is the highest among all the three strategies in the presence of639
the SSDF and Mobile attacks.640
The reason lies in that the integrated combination of the641
analysis of the distribution of interaction, real-time position642
information collection and multi-security scheme improves643
the accuracy, efficiency, and reliability of both the direct and644
recommendation reputation evaluation, and thus enhances the645
MDA of TRDG. Although the other strategies also adopt646
related technologies to improve the accuracy and reliability647
of reputation evaluation, they do not take all the above-648
mentioned influence factors into account. Meanwhile, they649
either consider only the improvement of the direct reputation650
evaluation, or just the improvement of the recommended rep-651
utation evaluation. Therefore, their MDA is lower than that of652
the TRDG.Moreover, both RCCS and JSSRAdo not consider653
the mobile attacks and cannot transfer malicious attackers’654
reputation value, which influence the MDA performance of655
them. Thus, the MDA performance of the TRDG is much656
better than of the RCCS and JSSRA.657
3) SPECTRUM DECISION ACCURACY RATIO (SDA)658
We also evaluate the effectiveness and reliability of the three659
spectrum sensing strategies by comparing their SDA perfor-660
mance to each other in the presence of SSDF and Mobile661
attacks.662
The results in Fig. 8(a) show that the SDA of the three663
strategies keep a relative stable high value in the presence664
of the SSDF attacks. This is because that all of the three665
strategies use the reputation and incentive mechanisms to666
incentive the user to provide true sensing information, and667
thus reduce the probability of the attack and increase the SDA668
of all the three strategies. For TRDG, the higher accuracy,669
efficiency, and reliability of the reputation mechanism leads670
to a better MDA performance than of the RCCS and JSSRA,671
FIGURE 8. Spectrum decision accuracy (a) with SSDF attacks (b) with
mobile attacks.
which makes the sensing information more accuracy and 672
improve the SDA of the TRDG. So, the SDA of the TRDG is 673
the highest among all the three strategies. 674
Comparing to the results in Fig. 8(a), in Fig. 8(b) where the 675
Mobile attacks are present, the SDAs of TRDG, JSSRA and 676
RCCS decrease by 6%, 10% and 12%, respectively. The com- 677
parison results show that theMobile attacks have a big impact 678
on the effectiveness and reliability of the SDAs of JSSRA and 679
RCCS. The much less decline rate of TRDG makes TRDG 680
keeping the highest SDA among all the three strategies in the 681
presence of the Mobile attacks. The reason is that the JSSRA 682
and RCCS lack of effective Mobile attack defense scheme, so 683
the trustworthiness and reliability of the sensing information 684
they collected are less than that of the TRDG, which makes 685
their SDAs are worse than that of the TRDG. 686
4) FALSE SPECTRUM DECISION RATIO (FSDR) 687
Finally, we analyze the false spectrum decision ratio of the 688
three spectrum sensing strategies in the presence of SSDF and 689
Mobile attacks. 690
The results in Fig. 9(a) show that the FSDR of all the 691
three strategies are less than 40%, which demonstrates that 692
all of them have a good FSDR performance in the presence 693
of SSDF attacks. This is because the proposed reputation 694
and incentive mechanisms in all the three strategies improve 695
the accuracy and reliability of the collected spectrum sens- 696
ing information, enhance the ability of resistance to SSDF 697
attacks, and then reduce the false ratio of the spectrum 698
decision. For TRDG, the proposed reputation mechanism 699
has greater accuracy and reliability than those of the other 700
strategies, and the proposed incentive mechanism is dynamic 701
and tightly coupled with reputation, all of these leads to a 702
10 VOLUME 5, 2017
IEE
E P
ro
of
H. Lin et al.: Secure CSS Strategy in CPS
FIGURE 9. False spectrum decision ratio (a) with SSDF attacks (b) with
mobile attacks.
better FSDR performance than of the RCCS and JSSRA. So,703
the FSDR of the TRDG is the lowest among all the three704
strategies.705
Comparing to the results in Fig. 9(a), in Fig. 9(b) where the706
Mobile attacks are present, the FSDR of TRDG, JSSRA and707
RCCS increase by 2%, 5% and 6%, respectively. The compar-708
ison results show that theMobile attacks have a big impact on709
accuracy of spectrum decision. However, the TRDG still have710
a best FSDR performance among all the three strategies. The711
reason is that the JSSRA and RCCS lack of effective Mobile712
attack defense scheme, so the accuracy, trustworthiness and713
reliability of the sensing information they collected are less714
than that of the TRDG, which makes their FSDRs are worse715
than that of the TRDG.716
VI. CONCLUSIONS717
In this paper, we investigated the challenging problem of718
protecting against internal SSDF and Mobile attacks for719
enhancing the security and accuracy of the collaborative720
spectrum sensing (CSS) in CRN based CPS (CRN-CPS).721
A new transferring reputation mechanism and dynamic game722
model based secure collaborative spectrum sensing strategy723
(TRDG) has been proposed, which incorporates innovative724
technologies in terms of the reputation value transferring,725
recommendation incentive and location sensing. The simula-726
tion experiments and performance analysis have verified that727
the TRDG is effective and efficient. More specifically, in the728
presence of SSDF attacks andMobile attacks, the attack ratio,729
the malicious SU detection accuracy, the spectrum decision730
accuracy ratio, and the false spectrum decision ratio of the731
proposed TRDG are better than those of the existing ICS,732
JSSRA and RCSS strategies. For the future work, we plan to733
introduce the encryption or signature based privacy preserv- 734
ing technology into the reputation mechanism and spectrum 735
collaborative sensing process to improve the performance of 736
privacy preserving. 737
REFERENCES 738
[1] J. Lin, W. Yu, N. Zhang, X. Yang, H. Zhang, and W. Zhao, ‘‘A sur- 739
vey on Internet of Things: Architecture, enabling technologies, security 740
and privacy, and applications,’’ IEEE Internet Things J., vol. 4, no. 5, 741
pp. 1125–1142, Oct. 2017, doi: 10.1109/JIOT.2017.2683200. 742
[2] S. Y. Lien, S. M. Cheng, S. Y. Shih, and K. C. Chen, ‘‘Radio resource 743
management for QoS guarantees in cyber-physical systems,’’ IEEE Trans. 744
Parallel Distrib. Syst., vol. 23, no. 9, pp. 1752–1761, Sep. 2012. 745
[3] I. F. Akyildiz, B. F. Lo, and R. Balakrishnan, ‘‘Cooperative spectrum 746
sensing in cognitive radio networks: A survey,’’ Phys. Commun., vol. 4, 747
no. 1, pp. 40–62, Mar. 2011. 748
[4] D. B. Rawat, S. Reddy, N. Sharma, B. B. Bista, and S. Shetty, ‘‘Cloud- 749
assisted GPS-driven dynamic spectrum access in cognitive radio vehicular 750
networks for transportation cyber physical systems,’’ in Proc. WCNC, 751
Mar. 2015, pp. 1942–1947. 752
[5] S. R. Reddy, ‘‘Heterogeneous dynamic spectrum access in cogni- 753
tive radio enabled vehicular networks using network softwarization,’’ 754
Ph.D. dissertation, Dept. Electron., Georgia Southern Univ., Statesboro, 755
GA, USA, 2016, p. 1392. 756
[6] T. Zhang, Security Issues in Cognitive Radio Networks. Springer, 2014, 757
pp. 88–113. AQ:3758
[7] C.-Y. Chen, Y.-H. Chou, H.-C. Chao, and C.-H. Lo, ‘‘Secure centralized 759
spectrum sensing for cognitive radio networks,’’ Wireless Netw., vol. 18, 760
no. 6, pp. 667–677, Aug. 2012. 761
[8] R. Chen, J.-M. J. Park, andK. Bian, ‘‘Robustness against Byzantine failures 762
in distributed spectrum sensing,’’ Comput. Commun., vol. 35, no. 17, 763
pp. 2115–2124, Oct. 2012. 764
[9] B. Kantarci and H. T. Mouftah, ‘‘Trustworthy sensing for public safety in 765
cloud-centric Internet of Things,’’ IEEE Internet Things J., vol. 1, no. 4, 766
pp. 360–368, Aug. 2014. 767
[10] A. S. Rawat, P. Anand, H. Chen, and P. K. Varshney, ‘‘Collaborative 768
spectrum sensing in the presence of Byzantine attacks in cognitive radio 769
networks,’’ IEEE Trans. Signal Process., vol. 59, no. 2, pp. 774–786, 770
Feb. 2011. 771
[11] S. Yadav and M. J. Nene, ‘‘RSS based detection and expulsion of mali- 772
cious users from cooperative sensing in cognitive radios,’’ in Proc. IACC, 773
Feb. 2013, pp. 181–184. 774
[12] M. Zhou, J. Shen, H. Chen, and L. Xie, ‘‘A cooperative spectrum sensing 775
scheme based on the Bayesian reputation model in cognitive radio net- 776
works,’’ in Proc. WCNC, Apr. 2013, pp. 614–619. 777
[13] A. Mukherjee, ‘‘Diffusion of cooperative behavior in decentralized cog- 778
nitive radio networks with selfish spectrum sensors,’’ IEEE J. Sel. Topics 779
Signal Process., vol. 7, no. 2, pp. 175–183, Apr. 2013. 780
[14] S. Li, H. Zhu, Z. Gao, X. Guan, and K. Xing, ‘‘YouSense: Mitigating 781
entropy selfishness in distributed collaborative spectrum sensing,’’ in Proc. 782
INFOCOM, Apr. 2013, pp. 2635–2643. 783
[15] Z. Li, F. R. Yu, andM. Huang, ‘‘A distributed consensus-based cooperative 784
spectrum-sensing scheme in cognitive radios,’’ IEEE Trans. Veh. Technol., 785
vol. 59, no. 1, pp. 383–393, Jan. 2010. 786
[16] T. Zhang, N. R. Safavi-Naini, and Z. Li, ‘‘ReDiSen: Reputation-based 787
secure cooperative sensing in distributed cognitive radio networks,’’ in 788
Proc. ICC, Jun. 2013, pp. 1194–1198. 789
[17] Q. Yan, M. Li, T. Jiang, W. Lou, and Y. T. Hou, ‘‘Vulnerability and 790
protection for distributed consensus-based spectrum sensing in cognitive 791
radio networks,’’ in Proc. INFOCOM, Mar. 2012, pp. 900–908. 792
[18] T. Zhang, Z. Li, and R. Safavi-Naini, ‘‘Incentivize cooperative sensing 793
in distributed cognitive radio networks with reputation-based pricing,’’ in 794
Proc. INFOCOM, Apr./May 2014, pp. 2490–2498. 795
[19] A. Attar, H. Tang, A. V. Vasilakos, F. R. Yu, and V. C. M. Leung, 796
‘‘A survey of security challenges in cognitive radio networks: Solu- 797
tions and future research directions,’’ Proc. IEEE, vol. 100, no. 12, 798
pp. 3172–3186, Dec. 2012. 799
[20] S. A. Mousavifar and C. Leung, ‘‘Energy efficient collaborative spectrum 800
sensing based on trust management in cognitive radio networks,’’ IEEE 801
Trans. Wireless Commun., vol. 14, no. 4, pp. 1927–1939, Apr. 2015. 802
VOLUME 5, 2017 11
IEE
E P
ro
of
H. Lin et al.: Secure CSS Strategy in CPS
[21] M. F. Amjad, B. Aslam, A. Attiah, C. C. Zou, ‘‘Towards trustworthy803
collaboration in spectrum sensing for ad hoc cognitive radio networks,’’804
Wireless Netw., vol. 22, no. 3, pp. 781–797, Apr. 2016.805
[22] H. Chen, M. Zhou, L. Xie, K. Wang, J. Li, ‘‘Joint spectrum sensing and806
resource allocation scheme in cognitive radio networks with spectrum807
sensing data falsification attack,’’ IEEE Trans. Veh. Technol., vol. 65,808
no. 11, pp. 9181–9191, Nov. 2016.809
[23] H. Lin, J. Hu, C. Huang, L. Xu, and B. Wu, ‘‘Secure cooperative spectrum810
sensing and allocation in distributed cognitive radio networks,’’ Int. J.811
Distrib. Sensor Netw., vol. 11, no. 10, pp. 1–12, Jan. 2015.812
[24] H. Lin, J. Hu, J. Ma, L. Xu, and L. Yang, ‘‘CRM: A new dynamic cross-813
layer reputation computation model in wireless networks,’’ Comput. J.,814
vol. 58, no. 4, pp. 656–667, Apr. 2015.815
[25] Y. Sun, B. L. Mark, and Y. Ephraim, ‘‘Collaborative spectrum sensing816
via online estimation of hidden bivariate Markov models,’’ IEEE Trans.817
Wireless Commun., vol. 15, no. 8, pp. 5430–5439, Aug. 2016.818
[26] A. A. Sharifi andM. J.M. Niya, ‘‘Defense against SSDF attack in cognitive819
radio networks: Attack-aware collaborative spectrum sensing approach,’’820
IEEE Commun. Lett., vol. 20, no. 1, pp. 93–96, Jan. 2016.821
[27] A. Sharifi and J. M. Niya, ‘‘Securing collaborative spectrum sensing822
against malicious attackers in cognitive radio networks,’’ Wireless Pers.823
Commun., vol. 90, no. 1, pp. 75–91, Sep. 2016.824
[28] H.-Y. Hsieh, Y.-E. Lin, and M.-J. Yang, ‘‘Weakest-link coalition: Fur-825
ther investigation on cooperative interference-aware spectrum sensing826
and access,’’ IEEE Trans. Mobile Comput., vol. 15, no. 3, pp. 774–788,827
Mar. 2016.828
[29] S. Chen, H. A. Love, and C.-C. Liu, ‘‘Optimal opt-in residential time-of-829
use contract based on principal-agent theory,’’ IEEE Trans. Power Syst.,830
vol. 31, no. 6, pp. 4415–4426, Nov. 2016.831
[30] Z. Zhu and B. Yu, ‘‘Amodified homotopymethod for solving the principal-832
agent bilevel programming problem,’’ in Computational and Applied833
Mathematics. 2016, pp. 1–26.AQ:4 834
[31] H. Lin, L. Xu, X. Huang, W. Wu, and Y. Huang, ‘‘A trustworthy access835
control model for mobile cloud computing based on reputation and mech-836
anism design,’’ Ad Hoc Netw., vol. 35, pp. 51–64, Dec. 2015.837
[32] H. Lin, L. Xu, Y. Mu, and W. Wu, ‘‘A reliable recommendation and838
privacy-preserving based cross-layer reputation mechanism for mobile839
cloud computing,’’ Future Generat. Comput. Syst., vol. 52, pp. 125–136,840
Nov. 2015.841
[33] B. Gao et al., ‘‘Incentivizing spectrum sensing in database-driven dynamic842
spectrum sharing,’’ in Proc. INFOCOM, Apr. 2016, pp. 1–9.843
HUI LIN received the B.S. degree in computing844
science from Fujian Normal University, China, in845
1999, and the M.E. degree in communication and846
information engineering from the Chongqing Uni-847
versity of Posts and Telecommunications, China,848
in 2007. He is pursuing the PH.D. degree with the849
College of Computer Science, Xidian University.850
He is currently an Associate Professor with the851
College of Mathematics and Computer Science,852
Fujian Normal University, China. His research853
interests include wireless and mobile computing systems, computer net-854
works, and information and network security.855
JIA HU received the B.E. and M.E. degrees in 856
communication engineering and physical electron- 857
ics from the Huazhong University of Science and 858
Technology, Wuhan, China, in 2004 and 2006, 859
respectively, and the Ph.D. degree in computing 860
from the University of Bradford, U.K., in 2010. 861
He is currently a Lecturer with the Department of 862
Computer Science, University of Exeter, U.K. His 863
research interests include performance modeling 864
and analysis, network protocols and algorithms, 865
next generation networks, cross-layer optimization, network security, and 866
resource management. 867
JIANFENG MA (M’–) received the B.S. degree 868
in mathematics from Shanxi Normal University, 869
China, in 1985, the M.E. and Ph.D. degrees in 870
computer software and communications engineer- 871
ing from Xidian University, China, in 1988 and 872
1995, respectively. From 1999 to 2001, he was 873
with theNanyang Technological University of Sin- 874
gapore as a Research Fellow. He is currently a 875
Professor and a Ph.D. supervisor with the School 876
of Computer Science, Xidian University, Xi’an, 877
China. His current research interests include distributed systems, wireless 878
and mobile computing systems, computer networks, and information and 879
network security. He has authored over 150 refereed articles and co-authored 880
ten books. He is a Senior Member of Chinese Institute of Electronics. 881
AQ:5
LI XU (M’–) received the B.S. and M.S. degrees 882
from Fujian Normal University in 1992 and 2001, 883
respectively, and the Ph.D. degree from the Nan- 884
jing University of Posts and Telecommunications 885
in 2004. He is currently a Professor and a Ph.D. 886
Supervisor with the School of Mathematics and 887
Computer Science, Fujian Normal University. He 888
is also the Vice Dean of the School ofMathematics 889
and Computer Science and the Director of the Key 890
Laboratory of Network Security and Cryptography 891
in Fujian Province. He has authored over 100 papers in refereed journals 892
and conferences. His interests include wireless networks and communica- 893
tion, network and information security, complex networks and systems, and 894
intelligent information in communication networks. He has been invited to 895
act as the PC chair or member at over 30 international conferences. He is a 896
member of the ACM and a Senior Member of CCF and CIE in China. 897
ZHENGXIN YU is currently pursuing the Ph.D. 898
degree with the Department of Computer Science, 899
University of Exeter. Her research interests include 900
machine learning, wireless networks, and perfor- 901
mance evaluation. 902
903
12 VOLUME 5, 2017
IEE
E P
ro
of
AUTHOR QUERIES
AUTHOR PLEASE ANSWER ALL QUERIES
PLEASE NOTE: We cannot accept new source files as corrections for your paper. If possible, please annotate the PDF
proof we have sent you with your corrections and upload it via the Author Gateway. Alternatively, you may send us your
corrections in list format. You may also upload revised graphics via the Author Gateway.
AQ:1 = Please note that there were discrepancies between the accepted pdf
[AcceptedPdfQuery_Access-submit-0831] and the [Access-submit-FINAL.doc] in the sentence
on lines 251–253, 551–556 and 733–737. We have followed [Access-submit-FINAL.doc].
AQ:2 = The subpart labels in ‘‘Figs. 6–9’’ have been hidden. As the images are non-editable, they not able to be
processed further to set them right. Please provide updated images or advice as to how to proceed further.
AQ:3 = Please provide the publisher location for ref. [6].
AQ:4 = Please provide the pubisher name and publisher location for ref. [30].
AQ:5 = Please provide the missing IEEE membership years for the authors ‘‘Jianfeng Ma and Li Xu.’’
